Things You Learn On A Ferry Trip!

Things you learn on a Wednesday evening ferry trip!

You know things aren’t right when…

… you hear your ferry is canceled when you’re already half way there.
… your alternative ferry terminal, Horseshoe Bay, is so windy that you don’t leave your vehicle to go to the bathroom.
… you find out your 5:00 pm ferry is the last one to leave for Vancouver Island.
… the swells are so bad that you don’t feel like eating dinner.
… the Captain says we will be making a hard turn and that we need to sit down, hold on, and brace ourselves – and then concludes gravely, “Here we go!”
… while he is saying this, you’re in a toilet stall with your pants down.
… you quickly pull your pants up [unrelieved] and hold on to the walls of the stall.
… you go to the bathroom quickly, waiting for the big Poseidon wave that… thankfully never hits.
… grown but panicked men are asking the crew, “Is this normal?”
… the passengers clap with gratitude when we hear the Captain’s address at the end of the ferry trip.
… there are hardly any other vehicles on the highway from Nanaimo to Victoria (because only idiots would be driving in a storm).
…. another storm is coming the following night, when we are coming home.

Wonderful.

Posted by Colin Welch at 11:30 AM
Edited on: Saturday, May 15, 2010 12:22 PM
Categories: Experiences, Humour

 

Is modern music going down the drain?

I recently came across an interesting article on the musical legacy of our current decade (2000-2009). The article, written by Kris Millet for Culture Magazine, takes a dim view of this century’s musical output. His central thesis is that the technological fragmentation of the last 10 years has destroyed our ability to follow a band for any significant length of time, and that a fragmented music press prefers short-term bandwagons that disrupt the long-term appreciation of a band.

While I sympathize with his viewpoint, I think there are other forces at work, too. The biggest one would be economic. Millet’s discussion of long-term support for U2 is a perfect example. What record label now can afford to support a band for four albums before it hits the big time? Not many, I would think. I know it’s old hat to blame record labels for everything that’s wrong in modern music, but their increasingly obsolete business model does have some upsides: money for promotion, grooming and time to learn.

I also wonder if songwriters are running out of ideas. Could it be that there is a finite number of good melodies? It would be impossible to measure, I guess, but maybe time will tell. Who knows – maybe in 10 years every rock and pop act will only be recording cover tunes. Then modern music will be just like classical music!

Posted by Colin Welch at 6:33 PM
Categories: Modern Culture, Technology, The Economy

 

Anatomy of a Murdered High School Course

On Sept. 22, The Tyee published an articled called “Anatomy of a Murdered High School Course“. Here is the text of my response:

…………………..

I appreciate the article, Nick. As an English 12 teacher and part-time college instructor, I can certainly sympathize with your point of view. I’d like to add a few thoughts to the discussion.

I followed TPC 12 from its inception, and I knew a number of teachers who, like me, were interested in its approach. However, TPC appeared doomed before it was even deployed. Like so many BC humanities courses, new and old, the TPC curriculum guide was hopelessly vague. It had so many mushy and feel-good objectives, so many potential learning resources, and yet so few practical classroom tools, that it seemed very difficult to work with. I know that professional autonomy is important, but this course was so formless that I had no idea where to start. And I wasn’t the only teacher to hold that view.

As you mentioned, the universities were never on board. As a result, the kids voted with their feet and many teachers interested in the course never got a chance to work with it. I‘m mystified why there is such a disconnection between the K-12 and post-secondary education bureaucracies. Why isn’t post-secondary approval secured well before a new course is introduced? This lack of prior approval has hurt other courses, too, particularly in math and social studies. I remember a Pro-D meeting a few years ago regarding the new Civics 11 course, and the Ministry rep. in attendance seemed to have no idea why the universities had not yet given their approval. To me, this affirmation is one of the first things that must be secured. Otherwise, why invest your time as a teacher in developing a new course?

With regard to your comments on literature vs. communication, I couldn’t agree more. But my solution is simple: I don’t take the En. 12 IRP very seriously. Thankfully, the provincial exam doesn’t really match the curriculum, and its literature demands have been scaled back, so I focus much more on writing, critical thinking and argumentation. My students still do well on the provincial, and I feel they are much better prepared for post-secondary education.

Posted by Colin Welch at 5:43 PM
Categories: BC Politics, Education

 

Firefighting: A Public Good?

In a 2008 speech for TVO, Naomi Klein discussed the shrinking public sphere in the United States. Already small by Western standards, America’s public sphere appears to be shrinking by the week. One of the few realms of American society that is still considered to be a public good is firefighting and disaster relief. But even that is disappearing. AIG Insurance (as well as Chubb Alarm) have set up their own private fire fighting forces to help insurees protect their homes… assuming your house is important enough to save. (For Chubb, that means a market value of at least one million dollars.)

Two stories that explain the trend can be found here and here. Notice that the business website (link 2) paints a substantially rosier picture in its conclusion compared to the Bloomberg article (link 1).

A “public good” can be defined as any item or service that is publically funded and available to all. Moreover, it’s good for you if other people also have it. For example, public education is a public good because it’s a benefit for you if other people around you are educated. Presumably firefighting is a public good, too, as the protection of all helps protect you as an individual.

The same is not true of a private good. This type of good does not require equal access to a product or service. The fact that others lack what I have (let’s say, a Porsche) is not a hindrance to me if they can still move efficiently with public transit, a bicycle or a Kia. Inequality in this case is a matter of reward and preference, rather than mutual benefit.

Canada’s ratio of public to private goods is slightly higher than the United States (especially with health care), but less than most western European countries. Even within Canada, Quebec sees child care as more of a public good, while most other provinces do not. BC still views basic auto insurance as a public good (“it’s good for me that other people are insured”), while Alberta or Ontario consider it a private good.

What constitutes a public good varies greatly. Each country tends to have a different ratio of public to private goods, but this ratio is a relatively stable predictor of daily politics. In other words, the dominant ideology of any country can be measured by this ratio. It shows how much we (or the political elites, at least) are other-regarding or egoists.

If we are living in an age of increasing political egoism, perhaps those who defend public goods, or seek their expansion, need to emphasize the self-interested nature of public goods (they help you, too). It wouldn’t hurt to also emphasize the efficiency of public enterprises when delivering goods we all need, in the sense that private enterprises replicate bureacracies and lead to higher administrative costs, like in the American medical system.

Posted by Colin Welch at 7:29 PM
Edited on: Thursday, September 24, 2009 9:16 PM
Categories: American Politics, BC Politics, Canadian Politics

 

Jane Jacobs and Gentrification

In a recent review of Anthony Flint’s book on Jane Jacobs (Wrestling with Moses: How Jane Jacobs took on New York’s Master Builder and Transformed the American City), Jason Epstein* argues that Jacobs has had a remarkable effect on urban planning and development in North America. Her triumph over Robert Moses and James Felt (New York planners who wanted to build an expressway through the heart of Lower Manhattan) shifted that city’s focus from epic infrastructure projects, especially for cars, to the preservation of mixed-use neighborhoods, replete with multiple housing types, mixed commercial and industrial properties, and accessible streets that organically connected citizens and structures alike. However, as Epstein concedes, this preference for preservation over slum clearance came at a cost:

The West Village was saved, but as with all victories, unintended consequences ensued. Clarence Davies, a Felt ally and head of the Housing and Redevelopment Board that

replaced [Moses’s] Committeeon Slum Clearance wrote … “that if the Village area is left alone and if no middle-income housing is projected by the Board … eventually the Village will consist solely of luxury housing, which we, of course, will be powerless to prevent … This trend is already quite obvious and would itself destroy any semblance of the present Village that [Jacobs and her allies] seem so anxious to preserve.”

The term was not yet in use but Davies had foreseen the gentrification that would within twenty years turn the Village into some of the most expensive real estate on earth. The mixed-income neighborhood of dockworkers and middle-class households and artists’ lofts that Jacobs championed would become the victim of its own charm. There would be little room for working-class families or struggling artists in the Greenwich Village that Jacobs fought to preserve. “Her vision of organic city growth,” Flint writes, “would do little to curb gentrification.”

Such unintended consequences remind me of Vancouver, a city that likes to believe it has successfully followed Jacobs’ vision. To a certain extent, it has followed her advice, such as avoiding large freeways through the middle of the city and encouraging (certain types of) people to live downtown. For this, Jacobs did compliment the City of Vancouver. On the other hand, the gentrification of Vancouver is well documented, and Vancouver is now one of the most expensive cities in North America. Like a planned forest, the downtown peninsula is a mono-cultured farm of cookie-cutter condos with no more than two bedrooms apiece. Many neighbourhoods appear devoid of 6 to 16 year olds. For working class and middle class people, the search for a place to live almost inevitably leads to substandard housing or a move to the suburbs. For families seeking three-bedroom anything, it’s no longer a lifestyle choice; it’s simple mathematics… and goodbye.

The dialectic of urban development, therefore, produces winners and losers. I`m now in Chilliwack. You can guess which side I am on. ………………

* Epstein, Jason (August 13, 2009), “New York: The Prophet.” The New York Review of Books, Vol. 56, Issue 13: 33-35.

Posted by Colin Welch at 3:41 PM
Edited on: Thursday, September 24, 2009 4:50 PM
Categories: American Politics, BC Politics

 

My letter on multiculturalism is used by the Globe and Mail

On Aug. 25th, a short letter I wrote to writer Daniel Stoffman was used at the beginning of his Globe and Mail question and answer session on multiculturalism. In response to his earlier article, I made the simple point that multiculturalism is not as central to the Canadian fabric as some people believe because there are other, more fundamental values at play.

Stoffman’s basic thesis is that Canada is not truly multicultural, even if it appears to be a commonly held perspective of politicians and journalists. Stoffman hedges his bets when it comes evaluating his own conclusions, though he does imply that it’s probably best for Canada to accept diversity rather than true multiculturalism – which he regards as a rather radical policy if taken to its logical conclusion. I’m not sure I share his rather extreme conception of multiculturalism, but I do agree that we overestimate its importance – however it is conceived – in our political culture.

Posted by Colin Welch at 12:11 PM
Edited on: Friday, August 28, 2009 11:48 AM
Categories: Canadian Politics, Language, The Media

 

Leaving out certain details

The trouble with truth and journalism is not that the media regularly publishes falsities. It’s that it usually omits important information or emphasizes certain facts over others.

Here’s an example: On August 17, 2009, the Vancouver Sun publishes an article with the headline, “Liberals funded by business, NDP by unions“. On the face of it, it would appear there is equivalence: business and unions support their respective parties to the same degree. But, of course, that’s not really true. The sub-heading provides a bit more detail when it reads, “Businesses donated 70 per cent of Liberal funds for 2009 election; unions gave 40 per cent of NDP revenue”. At least here we begin to see that there is no equivalence; Gordon Campbell’s Liberals are more beholden to corporations than the NDP are beholden to unions. Too bad the headlines and sub-headings aren’t switched.

Much more problematic is what is left out completely. The other way of understanding things would be to compare the absolute amount that the business sector gave to the Liberals, as compared to the absolute amount the unions gave to the NDP (in this case, between Jan. 1 and the May election). However, for some strange reason, those important numbers aren’t in the news story. By my calculations – using all of the raw data provided by the article – the NDP received $2.16 million from the unions, while the Liberals received $6.65 million from the corporations. That means the Liberal Party received over 3 times more money from corporate BC as the NDP received from the unions. Such an omission might appear subtle, but it certainly works to reduce the significant differences that the headline ignores. And so much for equivalence.

Posted by Colin Welch at 2:29 PM
Edited on: Thursday, August 27, 2009 12:27 PM
Categories: BC Politics, Language, The Media

 

Neil Boyd … Criminologist in the Clouds

On August 6th, Neil Boyd, a widely quoted criminologist from SFU, wrote an opinion piece that decried those who criticize him and other academic commentators on the issue of crime. Here’s a brief response.

………………..

Neil Boyd, a well known SFU criminologist, seems puzzled that people “don’t like what academics have to say” about crime. I would propose the opposite: Boyd does not like to hear what others think about crime, and that he represents a point of view that most Canadians wholeheartedly reject.

Boyd and many others in his trade take a social scientific view of crime. Criminal behaviour is analyzed with statistics and identifiable trends, and the response to crime is framed by rehabilitation, deterrence and other approaches amenable to measurement. Moreover, these empirical preferences carry a significant normative commitment, to which Boyd appears deeply committed.

But I would posit that the large majority of Canadians don’t see crime in the same way. They see crime, particularly violent crime, as primarily a moral issue, and have a normative commitment clearly at odds with Boyd’s professional perspective. Even if there were only one violent crime next year in Canada, the question would remain: did the convicted criminal receive a penalty of reduced entitlements commensurate to the rights he or she took away from his/her victim(s)? This is justice as equity or fairness. Crime in this sense is not conceived as a medicalized problem that must be solved by experts. It does believe that people must be held responsible for their actions, particularly when these actions are so heinous that they violate the basic rights of others. Indeed, it’s a view that believes the justice system is as much about the victims of crime as the criminals themselves. It also believes that drugs or alcohol – especially if attached to violent crime – do not automatically provide a get-out-of-jail-for-free card. If one is capable of the mundane tasks of eating, finding some form of shelter and securing drug supplies – all of which require at least a modicum of rationality – then why is such rationality immediately and quite conveniently ignored when it comes to criminal responsibility? Finally, it believes that the criminal justice system ought not be a social working institution. If there are legitimate human needs for social welfare, then why does it appear that the police and the courts are obliged to be primary social working agencies? They lack the requisite resources to accomplish such a lofty goal, with the end result that they do a mediocre job of both policing and social working.

The criminal rights faction usually responds (condescendingly) that this normative perspective is mere retribution, and that it doesn’t solve the problem of crime. Unfortunately, we rarely hear in any extended way why retribution is indeed wrong, except that it is supposedly “uncivilized”. Apparently moral responsibility is barbaric. Moreover, the demand for “solutions” merely restates a rather self-serving standard – the kind of standard that employs a lot of people in the criminal rights industry – that simply ignores the call for moral equivalence.

If Boyd wants to be taken more seriously, perhaps he should talk less of “ad hominem” attacks, and more of a fundamental clash of values. This may take him beyond his comfort zone of statistical analysis, but it might answer his aforementioned puzzlement more honestly.

Posted by Colin Welch at 8:41 PM
Edited on: Monday, August 24, 2009 2:44 PM
Categories: BC Politics, Canadian Politics

 

Notes and commentary on Chantal Mouffe’s “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?”

Mouffe, Chantal. “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?” Social Research 66.3 (Fall 1999): 745-758.

———————-

Chantal Mouffe’s article discusses two competing methods of envisioning an extensive (and thus radical) democracy. She confronts the theorists of “deliberative democracy”, particularly Jurgen Habermas, but also summarizes her own epistemological position of “agonistic pluralism”. Her article is clear and succinct, and she writes (as usual) with precise, relatively jargon-free prose. However, Mouffe’s critique tends to simplify Habermas’ position too strongly, and she succumbs to the either-or mentality to which she believes her opponents fall victim.

Habermas’s “deliberative democracy”, as typified by Seyla Benhabib (and summarized by Mouffe), identifies three central elements as the foundation of its theory:

“1. Participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same chance to initiate speech acts, to question, interrogate, and to open debate;
2. All have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation;
3. All have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out. There are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda or the conversation, nor the identity of the participants, as long as each excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question” (747)

Mouffe admits that Habermas and his followers don’t deny that there are obstacles to an “ideal discourse”, difficulties which are particular and contingent. According to Mouffe, this means that Habermasians now conceive of the ideal speech situation as a “regulative idea” (748). Moreover, “Habermas now accepts that there are issues that have to remain outside the practices of rational public debates like existential issues that concern not questions of justice but of the good life, or conflicts between interests groups about distributive problems that can only be resolved by means of compromises” (ibid). Nevertheless, Mouffe points out, Habermas still insists that “‘this differentiation within the field of issues that require political decisions negates neither the prime importance of moral considerations nor the practicability of rational debate as the very form of political communication’ [Habermas, 1991, p. 448]” (ibid).

Mouffe explains that Habermas considers his approach to be superior to Rawls’ because of Habermas’ “strictly procedural character which allow him to ‘leave more questions open because it entrusts more to the process of rational opinion and will formation’ [Habermas, 1995, p. 130]” (748).

Mouffe points to many other theorists to buttress her response. She deploys Wittgenstein as a key weapon against deliberative democracy. For Wittgenstein, procedural rules “are always abridgments of practices, they are inseparable of specific forms of life. Therefore, distinctions between ‘procedural’ and ‘substantial’ or between ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ that are central to the Habermasian approach cannot be maintained and one must acknowledge that procedures always involve substantial ethical commitments” (749). If we accept Wittgenstein’s “form of life (Lebensform)” (which is the foundation for consensus rather than rational dialogue), then such “an approach requires reintroducing into the process of deliberation the whole rhetorical dimension that the Habermasian discourse perspective is precisely at pains to eliminate” (ibid). As a result, consensus is always provisional, and should be viewed warily rather than positively. Mouffe argues, paraphrasing Stanley Cavell’s critique of Rawls, that the “deprivation of a voice in the conversation of justice can be the work of the moral consensus itself” (750). Mouffe also employs Lacan’s point of view (via Zizek) to bolster her perspective: A “Lacanian approach reveals how discourse itself in its fundamental structure is authoritarian since out of the free-floating dispersion of signifiers, it is only through the intervention of a master signifier that a consistent field of meaning can emerge” (751). In other words, consensus is the result of a particular and temporary constellation of forces, assumptions and discourses, and cannot exist without exclusion and Otherness.

With her critique finished, Mouffe moves on to an alternative way of conceptualizing democracy. What “I am proposing here is the need to acknowledge the dimension of power and antagonism and their ineradicable character…. there can never be total emancipation but only partial ones…. any social objectivity is ultimately political and that it has to show the traces of exclusion that governs its constitution” (752).

She goes on to claim that

“Political practice in a democratic society does not consist in defending the rights of preconstituted identities, but rather in constituting those identities themselves in a precarious and always vulnerable terrain. According to such a view, democracy requires that the purely constructed nature of social relations finds its complement in the purely pragmatic grounds of the claims to power legitimacy…. a) if any power has been able to impose itself, it is because it has been recognized as legitimate in some quarters; and b) if legitimacy is not based in an a prioristic ground, it is because it is based in some form of successful power. This link between legitimacy and power is precisely what the deliberative model is unable to recognize, since it has to posit the possibility of a type of rational argumentation where power has been eliminated and where legitimacy is grounded on pure rationality” (753).

Therefore, “the main question of democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic values” (ibid). Power is always present, so to “acknowledge the existence of relations of power and the need to transform them, while renouncing the illusion that we could free ourselves completely from power, this is what is specific to the project of ‘radical and plural democracy’ that we are advocating” (ibid).

Mouffe moves on to explain what a pluralist democracy would look like. She uses adversarial, even military terminology, and focuses on a democratic “adversary” who is “an enemy with whom we have in common a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of democracy. But our disagreement concerning their meaning and implementation is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion, hence the antagonistic element in the relation” (755). If we ever come to accept the position of our opponents, then it’s the result of “conversion” (in the Kuhnian sense) rather than purely rational persuasion. Mouffe concludes, “Compromises are possible; they are part of the process of politics. But they should be seen as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation” (ibid).

Mouffe emphasizes a conflictual model of society and politics, but one where we work with power, rather than pretend it can be ignored “under the veil of rationality or morality” (757). In keeping with other post-modernists like Foucault, power is constitutive of existence and therefore not inherently negative. As such, “… the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions nor to relegate them to the private sphere in order to render rational consensus possible, but to mobilise those passions towards the promotion of democratic designs. Far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence” (756).

She concludes with an insistence on flux rather than stasis:

“When we accept that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power and that always entails some form of exclusion, we can begin to envisage the nature of a democratic public sphere in a different way (ibid).

………….

I have a few concerns with Mouffe’s article. The first is with her vague use of “ethico-political principles” (755 and 756). She clearly finds these of secondary importance, but it’s not clear from this article what she actually means by them. She does concede some importance to them when she says,

“To be sure, pluralist democracy demands a certain amount of consensus, but such a consensus concerns only some ethico-political principles. Since those ethico-political principles can only exist, however, through many different and conflicting interpretations, such a consensus is bound to be a “conflictual consensus” (756)

Nevertheless, she doesn’t go into any further detail about their definitions. One gets the sense that there is a reflexive distaste for such a topic, and that’s all were going to hear about it. This vagueness is mirrored by the lack of precision about how we ought to organize power and our passions “towards the promotion of democratic designs” (ibid). What kind of principles can we put forth, on behalf of a radical democracy, which go beyond might makes right? Like Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Mouffe seems unwilling to engage in normative issues or examples that may lead her to universalist principles… or at least proposals that sound like universalism. It reminds me of Peter Dews’ epithet that, “For the post-structuralists, the universality implicit in the concept of truth appears as a threat” (Dews 222). And perhaps for Mouffe the best way to deal with a threat is to just avoid it.

In a related manner, Mouffe tends to over-simplify Habermas’ position. For Mouffe, the ideal speech situation is but a few steps to an “authoritarian order” (ibid). There is no mention that post-structuralists like Lyotard, Lacan and Foucault have investigated the communicative logic that’s inherent in intersubjective dialogue. For example, Foucault has argued that,

“In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation…. [For] the polemicist, on the other hand… the game does not consist of recognizing this person as a subject having any right to speak, but of abolishing him, as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue” (Foucault 381-382).

In other words, what is sought by deliberative democratic theorists, and some radical pluralists, too, is the procedural logic within communication itself. It may lead to procedures which are mired in particularist assumptions, but Mouffe has not (in this article) clearly explained what those assumptions are, and why they should be viewed sceptically. All she has argued is that all assumptions about rational procedure come from some perspective, so that’s enough to discredit any attempt.

Perhaps, as Dews explains in defence of Habermas, “it is not the quest for truth, but rather the violation of these [intersubjective] rights that will tend to take the form of coercion and intimidation”, and be the basis from which we resist domination (Dews 220; emphasis added). If so, then perhaps there is room for stable, meta-ethical principles of rational and moral conduct within a plurality of discourses. Otherwise, Mouffe’s conception of truth – where all paths to truth lead to domination – is as monistic as that which she claims comes from Habermas and his followers.

………….

Referenced Articles:

Dews, Peter. Logics of Disintegration, (New York: Verso, 1987).

Foucault, Michel. “Polemics, Politics and Problemizations,” in The Foucault Reader, Rabinow, Paul, ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1984).

Habermas, Jurgen. “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, Calhoun, Craig, ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991).

Habermas, Jurgen. “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason. Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy (March 1995), XXCII:3.

Posted by Colin Welch at 8:32 PM
Edited on: Thursday, July 16, 2009 8:50 PM
Categories: In a Philosophical Mood, Language