Notes and commentary on “No Contest? Assessing the Agonistic Critiques of Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere”

July 15, 2009 | Author: C. Welch

Notes and commentary on:

Brady, John. “No Contest? Assessing the Agonistic Critiques of Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 30.3 (2004): 331-354.

———————-

John Brady’s article, “No Contest? Assessing the Agonistic Critiques of Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere”, is a defence of Jurgen Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy. It attempts to address the general critique of Habermas’ theory by “post-modern”, radical pluralists like Jodi Dean and Chantal Mouffe. These writers argue that Habermas not only ignores the essential role of an essentially contested public sphere, but that his overly optimistic rationalism leaves us dangerously incapable of accounting for, in Mouffe’s words, an essential “pluralism of values” where consensus is conditional and based on exclusion. Brady responds that these writers have misread Habermas, and that he is neither overly rationalistic nor politically and ethically naïve. Habermas, according to Brady, is attempting to establish a “meta-ethical” (343) set of principles and procedures that are “limited, but nonetheless significant”, and which assist “the further development of agonistic politics” (349).

Habermas’ central philosophical project has been to “specify the norms that should govern citizens’ interactions on the public stage” (332). According to Brady, the “agonistic critique” views this “theory of the public sphere [as] hopelessly unrealistic in so far as it continues to rely on a conception of public politics as the rational exchange of opinions, despite copious and daily proof of the messy, conflict-laden nature of contemporary political practice” (ibid).

Brady provides an excellent summary of postmodern theory, and how we have learned from post-modernism that binary oppositions often mask the contingent nature of social life as well as the “constitutive nature” of excluding the Other (333).

Nevertheless, Brady notes that one such binary opposition remains strong among all theorists:

“… it is perhaps surprising how stubbornly one particular binary opposition has managed to shape the discussion between agonistic and deliberative democrats, namely the purported opposition between contest and consensus. With remarkable regularity, theorists on both sides insist on the fundamental opposition between a democratic political practice based on contestation and one based on consensus formation” (333).

This is a rich and suggestive point. Apart from academia’s apparent need for adversarial positioning, it does seem from my own reading that such a dualism remains quite strong within this debate on democracy. Like Brady, I wonder if both sides are talking past each other, and evaluating each other with categories that don’t really describe what the other is thinking. In any case, Brady’s point lays the groundwork for attempting a reconciliation of the two perspectives, to which we will later return.

…………..

After his introduction, Brady summarizes the critics’ position. According to Brady, Jodi Dean and others critics believe that Habermas’ theory has three central flaws:

“… the adoption of an homogenous and homogenizing conception of the public sphere; the denial of the constitutive role played by the exclusion of marginal groups, especially women, in the public sphere’s development; and, finally, the formulation of a concept of political subjectivity that belies the ‘conflicts and multiplicities already present’ in any subject” (337).

This apparently leads to an omission of the major role played by “gender, racial, cultural and ethnic differences” (ibid) in the public sphere.

Likewise, Chantal Mouffe argues (as summarized by Brady) that Habermas’ theory is flawed because of

“… Habermas’s adamant insistence that political questions can be decided rationally and that a public exchange of arguments and counter-arguments that takes place under conditions of equality, impartiality, and openness is the most suitable means of producing rational political opinion. To maintain such a position in the face of the ample evidence testifying to the irrational, power-soaked nature of contemporary politics, underscores the unrealistic, idealistic nature of Habermas’s model” (338).

The agonistic, pluralist model, on the other hand, redirects our attention to the tangible interplay of power. As Brady concludes, this model seeks to “address the bodily, psychic and emotional harms that Habermas, according to Dean, relegates to secondary importance by assigning them to the domain of ethics, tradition, and culture” (339).

…………..

Brady responds to this critique by reminding the critics that Habermas has never forsaken the realm of contested political activity (340-341). Brady contends that Habermas has always confronted “power, conflict, and political contestation over issues of difference” (341). Nevertheless, Habermas does not reduce himself to such concerns. He instead

“… offers an analysis that is at once more subtle and more realistic: it acknowledges the play of power in politics but also the real role that rationality and non-strategic political communication play in shaping public debate. Thus what Dean and Mouffe interpret as a preoccupation with idealistic aspects of public debate is actually part of Habermas’s attempt to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the public sphere, one that avoids a one-dimensional, reductionist depiction of politics as simply power politics” (341).

We see from Brady an attempt to break Habermas’ theory out of the suffocating binary dualism that Brady noted earlier. He directs our attention to the second-order nature of Habermas’ theory that escapes the unitary notion of politics which typifies Mouffe’s and Dean’s approach.

“From Habermas’s perspective, the articulation of basic norms of law and morality [with which Mouffe and Dean are primarily concerned] falls outside the domain of moral theory [Habermas’ central concern]. Moral theory’s charge is, instead, meta-ethical: it is to develop the principles and criteria of fair procedure that should govern any process of argumentation through which individuals attempt either to restore the validity of a norm that has been contested or to arrive at a valid new norm” (343; emphasis added).

Brady adds that such a domain is reflexive and self-critical (ibid). It must be capable of defending itself against “other ethical approaches” in order to provide a “theoretical reconstruction of the pre-theoretical knowledge that subjects possess regarding what makes normative argumentation possible”. Brady emphasizes the second-order, meta-theoretical nature of Habermas’ task:

“Communicative rationality is not, however, a subjective capacity that individuals possess and that would tell them what they ought to do. This is a decisive point. It means that a theory that aims to describe communicative rationality will not produce prescriptions for individual action; it will not tell individuals how they should best lead their lives or how they should best organize their society” (345).

Instead, Habermas provides a neutral set of procedures “through which political actors can test the desirability of political contestation as an ingredient in the continuing project of democratization” (346). Therefore, “Habermas’s theory opens up a space for democratic reflection and democratic action, a space that necessarily contains room for a consideration of agonistic politics. In this sense, Habermas’s theory facilitates the agonistic approach to politics” (348).

Brady concludes with a subtle rebuke of post-modern, agonistic theories with the following question: “Does the endless subversion of codes and norms contribute to democratic politics or simply to political frustration?” (349) Brady’s point is that we can’t afford to dismiss Habermas’ project. At some point, we need to establish norms and rules which govern our political lives. After all, politics is, by its very nature, the process by which we regulate and institutionalize the competing demands and values of citizens. Can “endless subversion” even reach a tentative or conditional set of norms and rules? Brady and Habermas would surely say no.

The next stage is to consider if such norms and rules – reached by reason-giving citizens – can claim to be truthful in a Rational, universal sense, or merely historical and contingent. Brady, Habermas and others, like John Rawls, attempt to offer a different way of looking at things. They want to refuse a choice between flux or stasis; they want to regulate the inevitability of the former with an enduring vision of the latter. It remains to be seen whether their attempt to order politics in a first-order and second-order manner will be successful. It’s certainly an immensely interesting and important question to me, and one that I will continue to examine.

 

 

Posted by Colin Welch at 8:35 PM
Categories: In a Philosophical Mood, Language

 

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Some thoughts on Barbara Herrnstein Smith’s Contingencies of Value

July 11, 2009 | Author: C. Welch

  The sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho’ he asserts that he cannot defend his reason by reason. (David Hume)

One of the best accounts of post-modern epistemology that I’ve read comes from Barbara Herrnstein Smith’s Contingencies of Value*. She provides a plausible and thorough explanation of what a “post-axiological” epistemology would look like, and offers a series of effective rebuttals to what the objectivists decry as “relativism”.

I place “relativism” in quotation marks because Smith emphasizes that what her critics consider to be relativism is not how she views the concept. Indeed, much of the book revolves around the contested notion of relativism, and providing a new conception that, by definition, does not fall victim to the supposed self-referential contradiction of the “relativist” position. For Smith, the failure of the objectivists to take the post-modern conception seriously means their critique is nothing more than a straw man attack, though they are so wedded to their own perspective that they’re probably unaware of the operating fallacy.

For Smith, value – moral, aesthetic, literary, social – does not have a timeless essence. Every time we point to one or more apparently objective truths, we can find contrary values at some other place and time. (Initially, at least, she builds on the skepticism of thinkers like Hume.) Values, and the judgments that follow, are the outcomes of a complex and interdependent set of interlocking positions, positions which change over time and space. Such values and judgments are contingent on social, psychological, economic, cultural and historical factors, and are not relative as the objectivists choose to see it:

“… value is “relative” in the sense of contingent (that is, a changing function of multiple variables) rather than subjective (that is, personally whimsical, locked into the consciousness of individual subjects and/or without interest or value for other people)(11).

To Smith, her conception of knowledge does not mean “anything goes” (in Paul Feyerabend‘s poorly understood phrase (217)). What we consider to be “truth” is anchored in a concrete reality, but a reality, for Smith, that is complex and shifting and impossible to objectify. It is from these positions that we make truth claims, but not truth claims as understood by objectivists. The claims made by post-moderns are provisional rather than a priori or foundational. If this analysis is correct, then Smith is positing a perspectivist account of truth, rather than a subjectivist or objectivist account. It also appears closely aligned with what is now called critical realism. We can make good arguments to defend our position or refute our opponents, but at no time do we (or should we) believe in their ultimate, timeless objectiveness. Therefore, making a provisional truth claim about the impossibility of objective truth claims is not contradictory. From this vantage point, truth seeking is always open, revisable and modest. Smith goes on to argue, specifically against Habermas, that

“… there’s no such thing as an honest opinion: no judgment, that is, totally unaffected by the particular social, institutional, and other conditions of its production or totally immune to the (assumed) interests and desires of its (assumed) audience… [these judgments are] the conditions under which all verbal transactions take place and which give them – or are, precisely, the conditions of possibility for – whatever value they do have for those actually involved in them” (102).

She also addresses one of the central charges against her post-modern stance: that her perspective renders her unable to produce coherent judgments, and thus leads to quietism. Such a charge, Smith replies, is an example of the Egalitarian Fallacy, which she characterizes in the following way: “unless one judgment can be said or shown to be more ‘valid’ than another, then all judgments must be ‘equal’ or ‘equally valid'” (98). In response, she says that (from her position) “it does not follow that all value judgments are equally valid. On the contrary, what does follow is that the concept of ‘validity’ in that [objectivist] sense is unavailable as a parameter by which to measure or compare judgments”. In other words, value judgments must be “understood, evaluated, and compared” by “something other than ‘truth-value’ or ‘validity’ in the objectivist, essentialist sense” (ibid).

It would interesting to actually see how she evaluates something in a manner “other than ‘truth-value’ or ‘validity’ in the objectivist, essentialist sense”. Smith comes tantalizingly close when she “answer[s] the Nazi” (154). If she were to act against the fascist, Smith says, “I would look for the fastest and surest way to escape his power; under yet other conditions, I would do what I could, no doubt with others, to destroy him” (ibid). The question that immediately springs to mind is, why? Why would she fight the Nazi? Why is he wrong? To this, Smith provides no answer, but argues that “‘answering the Nazi’ with axiologically grounded arguments will do nothing at all to prevent or destroy his power” (155). That’s true, but questions of “Why?’ are not meant to be functional or programmatic. In this context, “why” is an intrinsically normative concern. I suspect she would want to respond with concepts like freedom, autonomy and respect. The problem, of course, is that these words are universalistic in nature.

………………

And this leads me to my biggest concern with Smith’s general argument: she appears to conflate the act of making a truth claim (through speech or text) with the logical or objective truthfulness that the claim aims to reveal. In doing so, she counsels against any axiological or objective claims because they are grounded in the domination of “asymmetric epistemology”, a domination that appears to ensnare even the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School (173 to 175).

This leads to a problem. Smith herself cannot but help make (unlike the Nazi example above) a series of claims that, at the level of communication itself, appear to imply an objective character. For example, she states that

“There are no transcendental guarantees, and also no objective truths of History, Experience, Science, or Logic, and also no theoretical analyses, whether economic, anthropological, historical, political, or other, that can expose a state of affairs as objectively (that is, empirically, mathematically, or transcendentally) unjust or wrong, and thereby, justify objectively (that is, independent of our particular identities and perspectives) our desire that it be otherwise” (175).

At most times during her essay, she qualifies her statements, but in many important instances like above – where she wants to draw together her premises into clear points – she does not. Does this refute her own argument? I don’t believe so, but it does point to something that I believe she’s missed.

Is it possible for people to continually qualify their statements, particularly when they make some judgment as to wrong and right, or good and bad? Can they say, with every written or spoken sentence, “I believe…” or “To be sure…” or “From this point of view…”? It seems to me that this is exhausting and self-defeating. Not only do you get tired from language that steers you away from your original point, but its repetitiveness attacks your own sense of coherency and the confidence that your speech partner or reader has in the legitimacy of your claim.

And it may go deeper than that. Following cognitive psychology**, if we conceive human beings as creatures who seek to make meaning of their lives (in an abstract, moral sense), then these meaning-bearing creatures must seek consistency, not the “multiplicity of play”. To make sense of the world requires that we find a coherent and stable set of beliefs and doctrines. Such stability requires language that seeks stasis rather than flux. But let me be clear: what I’m positing is a human need to make truth claims as if they are objective claims, but this in no way necessitates – contra Habermas – an objective world of Rational norms. In this manner, I am postulating a psychological premise where “objective” truth is sought because we seek coherency with our basic moral and value perspectives; this position seems close to Rawls’ theory of justice as derived from a reflective equilibrium, and is something I will continue to investigate.

So how is this a problem for Smith? I believe that she ignores the necessary performative requirement to communicate as truth tellers, and that our language and human requirements make it impossible to live in the communicative world she recommends. It’s just too exhausting and confusing and cognitively painful. She may be correct – indeed, I believe she is correct – in the essentially contingent nature of moral and social truths, but that doesn’t mean people can always think and communicate like that.

As such, radical pluralists like Smith should not dismiss Habermas so readily. He might be wrong; but then again, as skepticists should always admit, Habermas could be correct. But even if he isn’t (or if he is not as objectivist as Smith believes), why do thinkers continue to seek standards of truth and reason? Is it intellectual imperialism, or is it an ingrained need (however futile) to make sense of our world? If it’s the latter, then maybe the all-or-nothing position she detects in her critics also drives her own theory into a corner.

Perhaps a more modest and provisional neo-Rawlsian/Habermasian project is in order.

………………

* Smith, Barbara Herrnstein. Contingencies of Value. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988.

** See, for example, Jesse Bering (August 2003), “Towards a cognitive theory of existential meaning.” New Ideas in Psychology, Vol. 21, Issue 2: 101-120.

 

Posted by Colin Welch at 6:33 PM
Edited on: Monday, August 31, 2009 4:36 PM
Categories: In a Philosophical Mood, Language

 

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Human society is the medium through which human capacities are developed.

June 16, 2009 | Author: C. Welch

The late Canadian philosopher, C.B. Macpherson, provides one of my favourite passages:

Human society is the medium through which human capacities are developed. *

His proposition has several profound implications.

To begin with, it is a direct attack on the idea that the individual (as a psychological, moral and economic being) is disconnected from and opposed to society. According to Macpherson, a man or woman is not some atomistic entity whose existence is attributable to self-generated, autogenic powers. Individuals are social phenomena, and the most individualistic, independent people are those who come from societies that provide the “necessary conditions [for] the development of individual capacities” (ibid). In other words, autonomous human beings – the moral goal of liberalism – can only develop within the nurturing confines of those societies that promote and venerate autonomy. Individualism, it should be noted, is not a genetic condition; it is a social doctrine that is ironically found in many societies which believe “society” is subordinate to the “individual”.

Macpherson’s argument also underlines the ideological nature of the “free will vs. determinism” debate. This debate, a staple of philosophy classes throughout the western world, can only make sense if we accept a central liberal tenet: human beings are free and autonomous to the extent that they avoid the determinism of society and culture. Leaving aside the elements of inherited physical traits (which Macpherson would say are still just potentialities), the determinism of society is, in the liberal view, necessarily negative. It is a fetter to human existence, and any concerted communal enterprise, like government, is a “necessary evil” (in the words of Thomas Paine). But Macpherson responds that the debate is all wrong. Instead of asking how can humans be free from society, we should be asking which type of society makes a human truly free. Rather than rehashing a false dichotomy that, in its uncritical manner, reinforces ideological doctrine, we should examine the sorts of conditions in society that allow for individuals to be free of fear, ignorance and want.

From Macpherson’s perspective, a liberal capitalist society is not the place to nurture an autonomous human being who aspires to be “self-governing and self-directed, in control of his (or her) own will and not subject to irresistable phobias, addictions, or passions”. ** Liberalism is committed to economic freedom, where equality of opportunity must eventually give way to an inequality of fortune. In such a society, success can only be measured in a very limited way: the material accumulation of money and stuff. Liberalism is also an ideology without a sense of time. It faces severe logical difficulties between, on one hand, its appeal to equality of opportunity, and, on the other hand, the accumulation of unequal wealth over time. To the degree that such accumulated, asymmetrical wealth is opposed to a “level playing field”, then liberal capitalism cannot offer the necessary conditions for the free development of all individuals and their particular potentialities. Freedom and equality are universal terms, meant to apply to the human condition, so when freedom is unequal, it’s no freedom at all.

For Macpherson, it is socialism – ironically, to a liberal mind – that in fact provides the necessary pre-condition for autonomy. Only in a society committed to equality and extensive democracy can human beings, all human beings, reach their true potential. Such autonomy is not beholden to the lonely and alienating passions of material accumulation. It is the product of a free people working together and sharing their communal responsibilities, and developing themselves rather than selling themselves.

——————-

* C.B. Macpherson, “Problems of a Non-market Theory of Democracy.” in Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1984) p. 57.

** Susan Mendes, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, (Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989) p. 53.

Posted by Colin Welch at 8:04 PM
Edited on: Thursday, June 18, 2009 9:41 PM
Categories: In a Philosophical Mood

 

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Wheat from the Chaff : My Review of Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?

June 11, 2009 | Author: C. Welch

Susan Moller Okin’s Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? is a fascinating application of liberal feminist theory to a major issue in western politics. Okin starts with the proposition that many ethnic minorities in multicultural societies do not believe that women are equal to men. This poses a particular problem for those who fight for equality if one of these ethnic minorities seeks constitutional protections under the policies of multiculturalism. Okin maintains that any ethnic minority that demands protective rights must not be granted those rights if it means the subordination of women. It would mean a liberal majority endorsing illiberal practices. Okin asks us to make a choice: if there is direct conflict between women’s and minority rights, the former should prevail.

The book is organized in a readable format. It starts with Okin’s original 1999 essay on the topic, a series of responses from fellow academics and writers, and Okin’s rejoinder to their arguments. All of the essays are relatively brief, and there is a good balance between those who support Okin and those who don’t. Most of the essays (though not all) are free of unnecessary academic jargon, and the book in general strikes a good balance between thoroughness and brevity.

Though I generally liked the book, there are some weaknesses. The most obvious to me is Okin’s refusal to say that, in the West at least, some values (especially gender equality) ought to be considered superior to others. She implies this several times, but she never seems to come out directly and say it. In addition, much of her evidence about gender discrimination comes from high profile court cases. I would feel more comfortable with more comprehensive statistical references. Nevertheless, I generally find Okin’s position (and rebuttals) to be very persuasive. Her emphasis on the fluidity and fractures within minority cultures is commendable, and she argues convincingly that young minority women – who are not yet assimilated into discriminatory values – ought to have their autonomy protected. Many of her detractors focus on the illiberality of western societies, and never seem to confront the even greater illiberality in many religions and non-western cultures. They seem to miss that Okin herself uses the promise of liberal universality against those who don’t practice what they preach. Others criticize her for not going far enough to include issues of race and economic inequality. Yet it seems that one essay cannot really be blamed for not discussing all forms of inequality, and Okin’s point of view certainly doesn’t exclude such considerations. Similarly, her argument is really about minority cultures in western societies, and is not a global condemnation of hierarchal cultures. Her critics sometimes go beyond the scope that Okin sets for herself. Finally, many of Okin’s most vehement critics are Muslim men, and the irony of their defensiveness never seems to dawn on them.

On the whole, I would recommend this book for those interested in multiculturalism, equality and the hierarchy of values within open societies.

Posted by Colin Welch at 11:07 PM
Edited on: Tuesday, June 16, 2009 9:43 PM
Categories: American Politics, Canadian Politics, In a Philosophical Mood

 

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My goodness! Canwest is suddenly interested in private energy production!

June 7, 2009 | Author: C. Welch

Though I avoid Canwest newspapers like the plague, I occasionally read The Province and The Sun when time permits. Today’s issue of The Province is a travesty. After largely ignoring run-of-the-river hydro projects during the recent election (when I did follow the two Vancouver dailies), the newspaper has finally decided to run a series of articles on the subject. Now. After the election. Thanks for contributing to the public sphere, guys. As Rafe Mair opined in his electoral post mortem, “the news media of B.C. utterly failed in its duty to inform the voters about critical environmental issues.” The rather belated interest in these issues from The Province, especially IPP’s (independent power producers), can’t help but make one cynical.

In typical fashion for The Province, it underdelivers on its reportage. In the main article, the serious issues of environmental damage are alluded to, but no specifics are given, and the high contract costs being shouldered by BC Hydro are only mentioned briefly at the end (where few readers venture). The second article, the one about “party lines” and IPP’s, is very short and vague, and it only paraphrases the (apparent) NDP position. No quotes from NDP leaders are given. Things get more interesting in the third article, which lists many of the Liberal and BC Hydro insiders who have jumped to IPP corporate positions, though the denial of conflict of interest from BC minister of energy Blair Lekstrom goes unchallenged.

However, if there is any doubt about the IPP’s in the minds of readers, Michael Smyth, The Province’s main columnist, comes to the rescue. His column follows the two page spread, and it attempts to attack the NDP and their apparent “hypocrisy” over the issue.

Smyth’s column is a laugher, one in a long line of snide, one-sided collections of bumper-sticker arguments.

He starts with a defence of the run-of-the-river project that will finally give clean energy to the In-SHUCK-ch First Nation on Harrison Lake. He contends the following: “But the critics won’t care. Comfortably ensconced in their own air-conditioned condos, watching their power-sucking big-screen TVs, they will condemn the First Nation and the private company it has partnered with.” Really? Will they? Exactly who has condemned this? When? Smyth provides no evidence for his prediction. Having lived near Harrison Lake for years, I have never heard such criticism of the In-SHUCK-ch project. [Ok… a week after I first published this I read some negative words from certain environmental groups… but nothing from the NDP.] Indeed, if there ever was an IPP project that the NDP would support, this would be the one. Moreover, the In-SHUCK-ch First Nation should have been hooked up to the power lines years ago – that is, to the power lines that are already there. The IPP that’s being proposed is not primarily for the aboriginals; it’s coming because power line infrastructure is easily accessed. It’s interesting that Smyth totally ignores the very controversial Bute Inlet project proposed by Plutonic Power. That company is rife with BC Liberal insiders and faces serious opposition from locals and environmentalists alike.

Smyth also says the “New Democratic Party now wants to shut these same projects down.” A typical exaggeration. A “moratorium” means that the whole IPP process will be temporarily halted and reviewed, and the stringent environmental processes that have hitherto been lacking (but which even Smyth acknowledges are important) will be put into place. Smyth surely knows what a moratorium means and what the NDP have said about the issue. To say that they will kill the whole thing is a blatant lie.

I suppose Smyth’s role is to mitigate any negativity from the other stories (making Dennis Skulsky and Gordon Campbell very happy), even though the other articles are pretty mild.

With Canwest columnists like Smyth, no wonder I usually read the The Globe and Mail, The Tyee and The Georgia Straight for my BC news.

Posted by Colin Welch at 2:20 PM
Edited on: Thursday, July 16, 2009 9:09 PM
Categories: BC Politics, The Good, The Bad, and the Stupid, The Media

 

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Is it the “Surge” that’s worked?

June 5, 2009 | Author: C. Welch

While many conservative supporters of the Iraq War have quietly disappeared – Dick Cheney notwithstanding – many have taken comfort in the apparent success of George Bush’s “troop surge” of 2007.

Nevertheless, a great number of commentators have pointed to other factors in the decline of Iraqi violence. The New York Review of Books has published a number of articles [here and here, for example] that point to the salutary effects of the cease-fire declared by the powerful Shia leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, and the revolt by dozens of Sunni tribes and community groups against the violence of al-Qaeda “foreigners”.

Michaels Massing’s recent review of Thomas Ricks’ latest book on General Patraeus nicely summarizes these factors, even though Ricks himself prefers to focus on the tactical changes brought upon by the leadership of General Patraeus and his staff. Massing notes that Ricks barely mentions al-Sadr, but Ricks is at least

… more expansive on the Sunni Awakening, recounting in detail how the tribes in Anbar province, enraged by al-Qaeda’s growing brutality, began in September 2006 to turn against the group, and how the Americans quickly took advantage. “Whenever a tribe flipped and joined the Awakening,” says a colonel who helped oversee the initial turnaround, “all the attacks on coalition forces in that area would stop, and all the caches of ammunition would come up out of the ground.”

What’s really interesting is that a major player in the troop surge, David Kilcullen, doesn’t believe that the surge is the major reason for the decline in Iraqi violence. Massing goes on to explain that

The regularity of this pattern has led some observers—including many US officers—to conclude that the Sunni revolt was the main cause of the improvement in Iraq. They include David Kilcullen, Petraeus’s counterinsurgency adviser. In his new book, The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen writes that “the tribal revolt was arguably the most significant change in the Iraqi operating environment in several years.”* Its impact, he argues, ran counter to what had been anticipated under the surge: instead of security improving as a result of changes imposed from the top down by US commanders, it occurred from the bottom up, with the US scrambling to respond.

We should therefore be very skeptical of any claim about a troop surge, either in Iraq or (coming up) in Afghanistan. And, as many of the articles above have shown, relying on local irregulars for peacekeeping may provide a temporary cessation of hostilities, but they do not solve the underlying problem of armed factions who are still not part of the political process.
________________________

* Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford University Press, 2009), p 179.

Posted by Colin Welch at 7:39 PM
Edited on: Friday, June 05, 2009 11:31 PM
Categories: American Politics, Global Issues

 

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Language Reveals Power

June 2, 2009 | Author: C. Welch

I’ve always been a fan of George Carlin. He was one of the first mainstream comedians to use humour against power, and there aren’t many comedians who have forced the US Supreme Court to consider laws on speech and obscenity. He was, in my mind, the great link from Lenny Bruce to present-day commentators like Jon Stewart. And Carlin was one of the few celebrities who never seemed to sell his soul… at least not explicitly. (I admit, Shining Time Station was not a highpoint of Carlin’s career.) In any case, you have to respect the wisdom of a guy who says, “If God had intended us not to masturbate, he would’ve made our arms shorter”. A modern day sage, I say.

On the other hand, I recently came across a passage from Carlin where he argues that “by and large, language is a tool for concealing the truth”. I’ve heard this kind of argument before, and I’m not so sure I can agree.

Is it language that conceals truth? Or is it the forces – economic, political, demographic – that encourage certain speech/text to be produced and venerated, and other speech/text to be censored, ridiculed or ignored? I believe it’s the latter. I’m not saying that language is neutral or inert, as if it’s a simple mirror that perfectly represents a physical reality. I just believe that language finds it difficult to hide its speaker’s or author’s intentions. Language just can’t help itself. If you know where and how you look, language will eventually reveal its relationship to power – be it domination or submission or defiance. Language is like that friend who just can’t keep a secret.

Case in point: the unions versus the bondholders in the ongoing GM debacle.

Have you ever noticed that the corporate press and their followers always couch union activities in moral terms? Thus, if a union like the CAW moves to defend its members’ pensions, the language of moral condemnation comes out with clarity and predictability. A good example (though a rather muted one, considering the source) comes from The National Post, Canada’s newspaper equivalent to Fox News. In a typical puff piece, the NP recently let Garth Whyte, the executive vice-president of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, write his own story. Read the article carefully. Whyte tries to be understated, but he just can’t seem to help himself. The union’s pension is ultimately a “luxury”. Whyte, of course, is against any bailout, because it’s “overly generous”. He taps into the private sector envy of public-sector pensions, and a bailout package that appears to be equivalent, and seems to think that if his RRSP has gone down, so should everyone else’s. [This seems to be the favoured sentiment amongst most of the union-haters who have posted on this topic in The National Post and The Globe and Mail.] In other words, union efforts are based on greed. Workers and their representatives are almost always cast as lazy, venal and undeserving. If they cause a company to collapse, it’s considered a moral failure. Damn those unions!

The bondholders are another story. These are the investors, by the way, who until recently would not agree to a settlement with GM (unlike the supplicating unions). In many ways, it is the bondholders who are responsible for GM’s current move into bankruptcy protection. But no matter. There is no greed here. At worst, their rational self-interest has been a matter of miscalculation. That is, it’s not moral at all; it’s a matter of business. Moreover, if their efforts are cast in moral terms, it’s with a different set of values than the one used against the unions. Rather than a list of vices drawn from the seven deadly sins, the morality of the bondholders is a matter of “conviction” as they struggle against the grasping unions and their government henchmen. So the NP portrays the bondholders as the victims of this tragedy, and reports (without a challenge) the following:

 

“The latest GM ‘offer’ sends a chilling message to all individual bondholders, not just those, like us, holding GM bonds: Contracts in America are no longer worth the paper they are written on,” said GM Bondholders Unite, a grass-roots group representing individual GM bondholders across the United States.

“The ‘offer’ to individual GM bond investors is ridiculously lopsided because it arbitrarily favors other groups, at the expense of the legal rights, under the U. S. Constitution, of hundreds of thousands of individual GM bond investors…. We aren’t asking for a bailout or a handout, just a fair deal. So we have no plans to back down.”

 

I guess we should forget that that a collective agreement is also a valid and legal contract, or that investment is the epitome of capitalist risk. But I digress. The conclusion I want to make is this: If you read and listen carefully, you can easily find the language of morality (good and bad) and/or amoral calculation that is interwoven into this particular narrative. And this is just the tip of the ideological iceberg. Cast your opponent as immoral, and yourself as objective and fair. Evil liberal, union-loving pinkos – bad; besieged, principled capitalists – good… or at least “fair and balanced”, according to Fox News.

So, language can’t hide its intentions. The secrets are too good to keep quiet.

 

 

Posted by Colin Welch at 11:38 PM
Edited on: Sunday, May 16, 2010 9:45 PM
Categories: Canadian Politics, In a Philosophical Mood, The Good, The Bad, and the Stupid